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A MASSACHUSETTS DEBACLE:
GAGNON V. SHOBLOM
Lester Brickman *
In Gagnon v. Shoblom,^ a case widely noted in the news media^
and closely watched by the plaintiflFs' bar, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court reversed the trial court's determination that a onethird contingent fee amounting to $975,000, was outrageous and un
conscionable. In an inerudite^ and iminformed'* opinion, the court
upheld the one-third fee and eflFectively rejected the applicability of
fiduciary principles and ethical rules to plaintiffs' lawyers' fees pro
vided their clients did not object. The authoritativeness of the court's
opinion is questionable.' Substantively, the decision rejects the
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
' Gagnon v. Shoblom, No. 88-2105 (Super. Ct. Hampden County Feb. 20, 1990), rev'd,
409 Mass. 63 (1991).
2 See, e.g.,Fees Out of Line?, NAT'L LAW J., Feb 12, 1990, at 6; Kennedy, Reduction in
Lawyer's $975,000 Fee Is Unanimously Reversed by SIC, Boston Globe, Jan 11, 1991, at 42
(city ed.); Bates, Key To The Courthouse, LAWYERS MONTHLY, Sept. 1990, at 1; Green, Judge
Decides Big Lawyer Fee Is Out of Order, Wall St. J., September 9, 1990, at Bl, col. 6.
2 The court did not discuss or otherwise indicate familiarity with contingent fee literature
or case law or the issues raised therein. For an analysis of both the literature and case law, see
Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies-. Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmarkl,
37 UCLA L. REV. 29 (1989) [hereinafter Contingent Fees].
^ Since the client did not object to the one-third fee, the appeal by his attorney to the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was ex parte in nature. The trial judge's opinion was
not represented. The attorney's position was supported by amicus briefs filed by the Massa
chusetts Bar Association and the Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys. The lack of
opposition resulted in the court's being uninformed of opposing arguments.
5 The ex parte nature of the appeal raises issues simU^ to those raised in In re Application
of Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67 (1860). The issue in Cooper broadly dealt with who had the authority to
regulate the practice of law in New York: the courts or the legislature. More specifically, the
issue was the validity of a legislative enactment providing that the graduates of Columbia Law
School should be admitted to the bar without judicial examination. Id. at 87-95 (discussing
the constitutionality of 1860 N.Y. Laws § 202). The lower court had decided that the act was
unconstitutional on the ground that the legislature had encroached upon its judicial power to
regulate the practice of law and refused to admit Cooper to the bar. In re the Graduates, 10
Abb. Pr. 357 (Sup. Ct.) (Bonney, J.), rev'd sub nom. In re Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67 (1860). Cooper
was represented on appeal by Theodore Dwight. Dwight had reopened the Columbia School
of Law in 1858 and constituted its whole faculty at the time. 3 A. CHESTER, COURTS AND
LAWYERS OF NEW YORK; A HISTORY 1609-1925, at 1337 (1925). This appeal, too, was ex
parte; no advocate opposed Dwight. The New York Court of Appeals opinion relied heavily
on Dwight's self-interested brief and adopted much of it although it contained errors of fact,
history and law. See Kennedy, Has The New York Legislature The Paramount Right To Regu
late The Admission of Attorneys'} (pt. 1), 99 N.Y.L.J. 1 (April 6, 1938). See generally Lee, The
Constitutional Power of the Courts Over Admission to The Bar, 13 HARV. L. REV. 233, 240
(1899). The ex parte nature of the appeal was later severely criticized by the New York
Supreme Court. Justice Sutherland characterized the New York Court of Appeals action as an
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court's own rules regulating the reasonableness of contingent fees®
and errs in its mindless rejection of fiduciary principles and ethical
rules. It should be rejected, as authority, by other courts considering
the vahdity of a contingent fee.
I.

CONTINGENT FEES

The contingent fee is a financing device which enables a client to
assert a claim while limiting his exposure to loss though also limiting
his potential gain.' The essence of the contingent fee is reward for
risk.® The risk-sharing attorney claims a reward, which is eflFectively a
multiple of his opportunity cost (hourly rate) for assuming the risks of
losing the case and of having to devote substantially more time to the
matter than anticipated. If risk is not borne, a reward for assuming
that risk cannot be claimed; if there is no contingency, a lawyer may
not charge a multiple of his opportunity cost. Stated simply, if there
is no contingency, then a lawyer cannot charge a contingent fee.'
Since only the existence of a realistic risk regarding effort and
recovery justifies charging a premium for risk, it follows, a fortiori,
that if there is risk, then the risk premium must be proportionate to
the risk and anticipated effort.'"
Charging a contingent fee percentage in a case involving little or
no risk, which is designed to effectively yield double or triple the law
yer's opportunity cost, or $400-600 per hour assuming an hourly rate
of $200, is almost certainly unethic^" and illegal.'^ It is just as un
ethical and illegal as a lawyer billing a client for fifty hours when he
has only worked ten hours. Charging for a risk that is not being as
sumed and charging for work not done are both fraudulent acts. An
analysis of Gagnon indicates that though the lawyer charged a sub
stantial risk premium, he assumed little risk.
"extraordinary proceeding" which had "the appearance of a want of respect for law and or
der." In re the Graduates, 11 Abb. Pr. 337 (Sup. Ct. 1860). When the issue of authority to
regulate the practice of law was revisited by the New York Court of Appeals in Karlin v.
Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928), Chief Judge Cardozo restated the history of regu
lation of the practice of law in England and New York. Id. at 471-77, 162 N.E. at 491-92. In
essence, he rejected Dwight's historical argument that courts did not possess the power to
regulate the practice of law, and in the process, corrected errors in Dwight's brief (available at
the Columbia Law Library, call no. TC 782431), the Cooper court's opinion, see id., and rele
gated In re Cooper to the briefest mention, id. at 477, 162 N.E. at 492.
® See infra text accompanying notes 34-36.
For an analysis of contingent fees, see Contingent Fees, supra note 3.
8 See id. at 89-93, 117 (analysis of risk).
9 Id. at 74-88.
JO Id. at 94-99.
J J Id. at 70-74; see also infra notes 45-60.
J2 Id. at 51-70; see also infra notes 37-44.
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SHOBLOM^^

A. The Facts
On a clear, dry afternoon, the plaintiff, forty-four years old,
stopped to assist a tractor-trailer which was stopped in the break
down lane of the Massachusetts Turnpike. Plaintiff parked his truck
in front of the disabled vehicle and went underneath it to attempt to
help fix it. A loaded garbage truck owned by Browning-Ferris Indus
tries, veered off the highway into the break-down lane and crashed
into the tractor-trailer. The driver of the latter was killed and plaintiff
sustained massive injuries, rendering him a paraplegic, paralyzed
from the waist down with permanent loss of bowel and bladder con
trol, of penile function, and requiring life-long medical care. Plaintiff
retained an attorney and entered a one-third contingent fee
agreement.^"*
A structured settlement was entered into with a present cash
value of $2,925,000, yielding a fee of $975,000 to the attorney.'' Since
this was a third-party action involving worker's compensation, the
settlement had to be approved by a reviewing board or a court.'® The
superior court judge of the court in which the action was filed felt that
the amount of the fee was extremely high and held evidentiary hear
ings on the fee."
The judge found that the attorney had worked hard, thoroughly
prepared, and presented the case well. Additionally, he achieved a
very favorable result for which he was entitled to be "handsomely
compensated.'"® However, under applicable court rules," the "rea
sonableness" of a contingent fee was subject to review by a court of
competent jurisdiction in light of the circumstances prevailing at the
time the agreement was entered into, including the uncertainty of the
compensation. The judge determined that at the time the contingent
fee was entered, "the hability aspects . . . were very strong and [the]
. . . injuries were probably catastrophic .... It was . . . highly prob
able that he would ultimately receive either a very substantial judg
ment or a very substantial settlement."^® Moreover, "it was obvious
13 No. 88-2105 (Super. Ct. Hampden County Feb. 20, 1990) [hereinafter Superior Court
Opinion], rev'd, 409 Mas*s. 63 (1991).
Superior Court Opinion, supra note 13, at 1-3.
15 Id. at 3.
16 Id. at 10 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 152, § 15 (West 1988)).
17 Id. at 4-5.
18 Id. at 8.
19 MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 3:05, §§ 5(e), 6.
20 Superior Court Opinion, supra note 13, at 4-5. The court noted that after the action had
been commenced, defendants developed a "plausible defense"—that the driver was suffering
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. . . that the case would probably culminate in a negotiated settlement
. ..
He then went on to state:
I am satisfied (both on the basis of my own experience as a practic
ing attorney and as a trial judge as well as by the evidence
presented at the hearings) that in the case of a civil tort action in
which damages are sought for personal injuries a contingent fee of
33 1/3% of the amount recovered is reasonable to a point . . . .
[HJowever,... as the size of the recovery (and hpnce the size of the
fee) increases, the spread between the attorney's fee and the fair
value of the time, eflFort and skill that he devoted to earning that fee
widens—and at some point the fee becomes unreasonable and even
(if the spread becomes wide enough) outrageous or unconsciona
ble. . . . When as in this case the injury sustained by the client is
catastrophic, the amount of the reduction [in the client's recovery
due to his lawyer's fee] can become enormous .... [A]fter all, [it is
the client and not the lawyer]... who must spend the remainder of
his life confined to a wheelchair with no bowel or bladder control
and with constant dependence upon others to assist him in the nor
mal tasks of day-to-day hving. In a case such as this it is not rea
sonable to apply the 33 1/3% rate. . . .
In summary . . . [the attorney] had a very good case from the
beginning. He had a strong case of liability, catastrophic damages,
and a defendant with the financial wherewithal to pay almost any
judgment that might be obtained. In addition, he had the benefit of
the workmen's compensation act which meant that his client's
medical expenses would be paid and that the client would be pro
vided with sufficient income to survive while the third party action
was pending, so pressure for a quick settlement was not nearly as
intense as it would have been had no compensation benefits been
available. It was very nearly an ideal case from the point of view of

a plaintiff's trial attorney?^

After rejecting the attorney's argument that the $975,000 fee was
reasonable in light of the amount of time devoted,the judge then
from obstructive sleep apnea—^but that the lawyer "through preparation and research" met
that challenge, id. at 5, and that despite the theory advanced by defendsmts, the plaintiff's case
remained a strong one, id. at 7.
21 Id. at 7-8.
22 Id. at 11-14 (emphasis supplied).
23 Although the attorney did not keep time records, he did produce an estimate of the time
he and his staff had devoted: 2,659.75 hours and 1,973.50 hours respectively. The judge
responded:
I frankly find those estimates to be somewhat generous .... The issues involved,
both legal and factual, were not so complex as to justify what would have
amounted to devotion of nearly all of [the attorney's] own time for over a year,
plus a substantial period of his staff's time, to a single case.
Id. at 6. Moreover, the judge continued, though not so informed by the attorney, he had

1991]

MASSACHUSETTS DEBACLE

1421

reduced the fee to $695,000.^'*
B.

Analysis of the Superior Court's Decision

The determination to reduce the one-third fee by 28.7% to
23.76% of the settlement value was predicated on the unreasonable
ness of the one-third fee. After analyzing risk factors the court con
cluded that: it was apparent at the time of contracting that a
multimillion dollar verdict was highly likely; the defendant had deep
pockets; the client's medical and hving expenses were being provided
for while the action was pending; and that this was very nearly an
ideal case.^® However, the court failed to carry its analysis to the ob
vious conclusion to which its analysis inexorably led. Instead of
branding the amount of the fee as unreasonable, the court should have
said:
The attorney is limited to a fee commensurate with the
risk he assumed. The court determines that the risk home
by the attorney at the time of entering into the retainer
agreement was negligible and the substantial risk premium
being charged violated both fiduciary law and ethical princi
ples. Therefore the fee shall be reduced to an amount pro
portionate to the risk the attorney assumed.
Since it was apparent at the time of contracting that a
recovery of at least $2,500,000 was to be anticipated, that it
was highly likely that the claim would be settled rather than
tried, that the attorney would likely have to devote 500
hours to the matter, and that a fee of $250 per hour would
generously compensate the attorney for the neghgible risk
he was assuming, a fee of $125,000 was appropriate. There
fore, the percentage that the attorney can legitimately
charge is 5.0% ($125,000 divided by $2,500,000)." How
ever, to build in additional protection for the attorney, in
learned that the attorney had also been retained to represent the estate of the driver of the
tractor-trailer and the driver's mother, that that work done was undoubtedly included in the
time estimates prepared by the attorney, that these claims had already been settled, and that
the attorney had received a substantial but undisclosed fee for these services. Id. at 6-7. He
also noted that the attorney had indicated expenses of $72,000 for both sets of representation,
mainly for production of a video tape for use as a negotiating tool which cost was to come out
of the attorney's fees. Id. The judge did not indicate if he had inquired whether the attorney
had represented any other clients or devoted time to any other matter that year; according to
the attorney's time estimate, he could not have done so unless he was an insomniac.
24 The judge found that a fee of 33 1/3% of the first $300,000, 25% of the next $1,200,000
and 20% of all amounts in excess of $1,500,000 would be reasonable. Id. at 15.
23 Id. at 11-14.
26 See Contingent Fees, supra note 3, at 94-99.
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light of costs to be advanced, the court sets the contingent
fee at 10%, which is designed to generate a fee of $250,000,
or an hourly rate of $500.
Instead of such an analysis, the court resorted to a form of gas
tronomic jurisprudence: I know an unreasonable fee when I see it"
and deep down in my gut, I know that $975,000 is too high a fee given
what occurred.^®
The failure of the court to apply the doctrihally supportable, in
tellectual construct of the relationship between risk and reward for
risk, between contingency and contingent fee,^' and to use instead an
idiosyncratic expression of reasonableness, left its decision highly vul
nerable to the depredations of the trial bar.^°
C.

Gagnon Before the Massachusetts Supreme Court

In a unanimous decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court reversed the lower court and awarded the attorney the entire
$975,CXX) fee.^' Interpreting Massachusetts law, it concluded that the
purpose of subjecting the settlement of a third-party action to judicial
review did not include protecting the client's interests.
As for its own rule requiring that a contingent fee be reason
able,^^ the court held that the rule did not apply "because no one is
challenging the contingent fee agreement."^"^ The court recognized
that even without its rule requiring that a contingent fee be reason
able, courts had inherent power to review a fee for reasonableness.
However, that power could only be exercised if the fee was challenged
by a party. The Massachusetts court's contention that a contingent
fee's reasonableness is insulated from review if the client does not ob
ject is without support in Massachusetts or any other jurisdiction.^®
27 With apologies to Justice Potter Stewart. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197
(Stewart, J., concurring).
28 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
29 See generally Contingent Fees, supra note 3.
20 The Massachusetts Academy of Trial Lawyers' Amicus Curiae Brief noted; "The ruling
below reflects little more than the judge's personal notion of reasonableness . . .." Massachu
setts Academy of Trial Lawyers' Amicus Curiae Brief for Appellant at 11, Gagnon v. Shablom, 409 Mass. 63 (1991) (No. 5399). The opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court reflects the effectiveness of this characterization of the lower court's opinion as idiosyn
cratic rather than principled.
21 Gagnon v. Shablon, 409 Mass. 63 (1991).
22 Id. at 66.
22 Id. at 66-67.
3* Id. at 67.
25 Id.
26 A modicum of support for the court's position that a client complaint is a sine qua non
for the application of fiduciary law and ethical rules to attorney fees may be found in United
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It is wrong as a matter of law, policy, and ethics.
III.

FIDUCIARY LAW

Lawyers, as fiduciaries for their clients,^' are held to a faimessStates V. Vague, 521 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. 111. 1981), rev'd, 697 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1983). In
Vague, United States District Court Judge John F. Grady ordered a criminal defendant's at
torney to return part of the fee that he had collected from defendant on the ground that the fee
was exorbitant. The defendant and a codefendant were indicted for possession of, and, con
spiring to possess, goods stolen from O'Hare Airport. After some procedural skirmishing,
both defendants agreed to a plea bargain. In reading the presentence report. Judge Grady
learned that the defendant's attorney had charged a fee of $12,000. Upon further inquiry, he
determined that the attorney had put in, at most, forty hours of work beneficial to his client of
which about two-thirds had been spent in listening to tape recording of electronic surveil
lance. Also, he learned that the codefendant's lawyer had charged his client $1,250. Judge
Grady then limited the defendant's attorney to a fee of $2,500 and when the attorney refused
to refund any amount below $8,000 adjudged him in civil contempt.
Judge Grady is one of very few judges who has demonstrated a persistent willingness to
..Taminff attorney's fees and to order their reduction when they violate fiduciary and etUcal
rules. He is particularly outspoken about contingent fee abuses. See Grady, Some Ethical
Questions About Percentage Fees, 2 LITIGATION 20 (Summer 1976). (He is joined m this re
gard by United States District Judge Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York. See
In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff d, 818 F.2d
226 (2d Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988)).
On appeal of the Vague judgment, the attorney argued that his fee arrangement was none
of the court's business since his client did not complain about the fee. Although Judge P^er
writing for the Seventh Circuit found that position "untenable," Vague, 697 F.2d at 806, a
closer reading of his opinion reflects otherwise. In finding in favor of the attorney. Judge
Posner stated: "A judge cannot be made to approve an unethical transaction, but the district
judge ... was not asked to do any such thing; he was just asked to decide . . . [defendant's]
punishment for a crime. To reach the fee question the judge had to start a separate proceed
ing." Id. at 808. Since defendant has "yet to raise a peep about the fee that the district judp
has so vigorously denounced as excessive ... we cannot find any basis for what the judge ^d in
this case . . . ." Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, instead of ordering a fee reduction in re
sponse to the ethical violation, the trial judge should have reported the unethical conduct to
the disciplinary authorities.
In dissent. Judge Grant pointed out that the court had sustain^ Judge Grady's reducfaon
of attorney fees in another case even though the parties had not objected to the fee. Id. at 809
(citing Rosquist v. Soo Line R.R., 692 F.2d 1107 (7th Cir. 1982)). More imimrtantly. Judge
Grant noted that other circuits had sustained a trial court's inherent authority to supervise
attorney's fees. /d. at 1111. Indeed, it is universally held that a judge has the inherent power
to supervise attorney fees in matters before the court. Contingent Fees, supra note 3, at 39
n.42, 56 n.97.
,. . . ^
Judge Posner*s response to Judge Grant*s well-supported proposition that judges have
inherent power to regulate fees in matters before them was to ignore the point. Moreover,
Judge Grady's sua sponte fee reduction was not a disciplinary response to violation of the rules
of professional ethics, but rather one based on the lawyer's breach of the fiduciary obligation to
the client to charge no more than a fair fee. For a discussion of fiduciary obligation, see infra
notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
37 See C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 4.1, at 146 (1986). This Article prints
an abbreviated discussion of the fiduciary obligation of a lawyer. For a fuller analysis, see
Contingent Fees, supra note 3, at 44-70, and Brickman, Attorney-Client Fee Arbitration: A Dis
senting View, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 277, 284 n.41 [hereinafter Fee Arbitration].
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in-fact" standard, which is a higher and less self-interested standard
than is appUed to commercial transactants.^® Under this standard, it
is the attorney's obligation to give the same advice to his chent in
matters aflFecting the relationship as the client would have received
had he sought the advice of a second lawyer.^® The faimess-in-fact
standard mandates that the attorney cannot use his superior knowl
edge or position to take advantage of the chent."^ The standard is
violated, regardless of intent, whenever an attorney's action benefits
the attorney, is not in the best interests of the client and the client has
not given his informed consent."^'
The faimess-in-fact standard applies to the attorney-client fee
transaction."*^ As a matter of fiduciary law, an attorney is not permit
ted to charge in excess of a reasonable fee."*^ Even if the chent con
sents to the fee, but an informed and knowledgeable client would not
have entered into the fee agreement, then the lawyer has likely
breached the fiduciary standard."*^
Fee Arbitration, supra note 37, at 284 n.43.
39 Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. Jun. 266, 278, 31 Eng. Rep. 1044, 1050 (Ch. 1801); see also. Fee
Arbitration, supra note 37, at 284 n.43.
^ See Whitehead v. Kennedy, 69 N.Y. 462, 466 (1877).
Fee Arbitration, supra note 37, at 285 nn.48-49, 288 n.60.
« Id. at 287 n.57.
^3 See Kiser v. Miller, 364 F. Supp. 1311 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub
nam. Kiser v. Huge, 517 F.2d 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Kiser, the district court stated;
[A]n attorney is entitled to no more than a reasonable fee, no matter what fee is
specified in the contract, because an attorney, as a fiduciary, cannot bind his client
to pay a greater compensation for his services than the attorney would have the
right to demand if no contract had been made.
Id at 1319; see also G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 99 (1978) ("A contract
for a [legal] fee is, under general principles of law, a contract between a fiduciary and his
protected dependent. .. [and] it is unenforceable unless its terms are fair to the client."); 520
E. 72nd Commercial Corp. v. 520 E. 72nd Owners Corp., 691 F. Supp. 728, 738 (S.D.N.Y.
1988), aff'd, 872 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1989); Newman v. Silver, 553 F. Supp. 4855, 496
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 713 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1983).
^ Contingent Fees, supra note 3, at 51 n.88. When a client "consents" to an excessive fee,
a rebuttable presumption is raised that the client has not comprehended the agreement. See
Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 106, 160 N.E.2d 43, 48, 188 N.Y.S.2d 491, 498 ("[T]he amount of
the fee, standing alone and unexplained, may be sufficient to show that an unfair advantage
was taken of the client . . . ."), modified, 6 N.Y.2d 983, 161 N.E.2d 736, 191 N.Y.S.2d 951
(1959), appeal dismissed and cert denied, 361 U.S. 374 (1960); High Point Casket Co. v.
Wheeler, 182 N.C. 459, 467, 109 S.E. 378, 383-84 (1921) (contingent fee percentage alone can
show that unfair advantage has been taken of client); Committee on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson,
352 S.E.2d 107, 113 (W. Va. 1986) (client agreed to pay contingent fee exceeding risk of
nonrecovery though he could afford to pay hourly fee and was informed of the hourly fee
choice and risk; the court assumed the client did not understand discussion of risk and had not
given "fully informed consent"); see also Kiser, 364 F. Supp. at 1319; Florida Bar v. Moriber,
314 So. 2d 145, 148 (Fla. 1975); In re Kutner, 78 lU. 2d 157, 399 N.E.2d 963 (1979); Cooper &
Keys V. Bell, 127 Tenn. 142, 153 S.W. 844 (1913); of. Klemm v. Superior Ct., 75 Cal. App. 3d
893, 898, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509, 512 (1977) ("As a matter of law a purported consent to dual
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ETHICAL OBLIGATION'^'

Much of the law of professional responsibility is a codification of
fiduciary doctrine.'^ Thus, the ethical duty that prohibits lawyers
from "enter[ing] into an agreement for, charging], or collecting] an
illegal or clearly excessive fee'"^^ derives from the fiduciary faimess-infact standard. Both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct recognize the validity
of contingent fees.'^® The ethical justification for these approvals nec
essarily lies in the assumption that the lawyer's risk of receiving no
fee, or a fee that effectively will be below his hourly rate, merits com
pensation in and of itself; bearing risk entitles the lawyer to a com
mensurate risk premium.'*'
If a lawyer charges a premium for risk which he is not assuming,
that conduct is illegal and unethical. It is illegal because it violates
the lawyer's fiduciary duty to deal fairly with clients.'" Since the con
duct is illegal, it is therefore unethical.'*
representation of litigants with adverse interests at a contested hearing would be neither intelli
gent nor informed."); Schenck v. Hill, Lent & Troescher, 140 Misc. 2d 288, 289, 530 N.Y.S.2d
486, 487 (Sup. Ct. 1988). In Schenck, a lawyer hired to sue another lawyer for malpractice
was binniflf a potential defendant in the same action and obtained client consent to waive the
conflict of interest. In disqualifying the lawyer, the court said, "[T]he consent obtained in this
case does not reflect a full understanding of the legal rights being waived
|T]he unsophisti
cated client, relying upon the confidential relationship with his lawyer, may not be regarded as
able to understand the ramifications of the conflict, however much explained to him." Id. at
289-91, 530 N.Y.S.2d. at 487 (citations omitted); see also Wade v. Clemmons, 84 Misc. 2d 822,
826, 377 N.Y.S.2d 415, 419 (Sup. Ct. Sp. Term 1975) (striking down contingent fee because
client, if properly advised, would have refused to agree to settlement offer yielding fee but no
client recovery). But cf. Jones v. Jones, 333 Mo. 478, 485-86, 63 S.W.2d 146, 149-50 (1933)
(no evidence of fraud or undue influence existed in making of contract in spite of defendant s
lack of legal background).
45 This Article presents an abbreviated discussion of the ethical considerations surrounding
lawyers' fees. For a fuller analysis, see Contingent Fees, supra note 3, at 44 n.65, 70-74; Fee
Arbitration, supra note 37, at 289-92.
46 Contingent Fees, supra note 3, at 44 n.65.
47 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(A) (1981) [hereinafter
MODEL CODE]. The MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 (1983) [hereinaf
ter MODEL RULES] restates the requirement as follows: "A lawyers's fee shall be reasonable."
The Model Code's comparison in Rule 1.5 indicates that the only intended deviation from
MODEL CODE DR 2-106(B) is the additional factor of the client's ability to pay, allowing
courts to consider subsequent events in determining whether a fee is excessive.
48 MODEL CODE, supra note 47, DR 5-103(A)(2); MODEL RULES, supra note 47, Rule
1.5(c); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1521
(1986).
49 Pennslyvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 735-36 (1987)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting): "In the private market, lawyers charge a premium when their en
tire fee is contingent on winning.... The premium ...compensates for the risk of nonpayment
if the suit does not succeed . . . ." Id. (emphasis in original).
50 Supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
51 MODEL CODE, supra note 47, DR 2-106(A), DR 1-102(A)(1); MODEL RULES, supra
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It is also unethical because by charging for a service that was not
provided, the lawyer is "engaging] in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."^^ Such conduct is also unethical
because charging a contingent fee grossly disproportionate to any re
alistic risk of nonrecovery would amount to charging a "clearly exces
sive" and "unreasonable fee."^^ Accordingly, a lawyer who charged a
one-third contingent fee in all cases, regardless of diflFering risks,
would be charging an "illegal or clearly excessiVe" and "unreasonable
fee" in those cases where there was little or no risk of nonrecovery or
of greatly increased eflFort."*
The lawyer's obligation to deal fairly with the client is also mani
fested in the requirement that the client give informed consent to all
important decisions.®' For consent, including consent to the fee arnote 47, Rule 8.4 comment; see also Martin, When Are Fees Unconscionable?, CAL. LAW.,
Jime 1988, at 88 ("A fee is illegal if it violates a . . . public policy.").
MODEL CODE, supra note 47, DR 1-102(A)(4); see also Committee on Legal Ethics v.
Tatterson, 352 S.E.2d 107, 114 (W. Va. 1986) (holding that misrepresenting the difficulty of
collecting proceeds to justify an excessive fee violates DR 1-102(A)(4)). A lawyer charging for
a risk that was not assumed is the functional equivalent of a lawyer charging for hours of work
that were not performed.
53 Supra note 47; see also In re Mercer, 126 Ariz. 274, 277-78, 614 P.2d 816, 819 (1980)
(holding that the inclusion of worker's compensation payment in contingent fee bill is a charge
for which no services were performed and therefore is clearly excessive and violative of DR 2106); Tatterson, 352 S.E.2d at 114 ("In the absence of any real risk, an attorney's purportedly
contingent fee which is grossly disproportionate to the amount of work required is a 'clearly
excessive fee' within the meaning of Disciplinary Rule 2-106(A)."); G. HAZARD & W. HODES,
THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON
DUCT 74-75 (1985) (stating that contingent fee is unreasonable where risk of nonrecovery
under given facts is negligible); 1 S. SPEISER, ATTORNEYS' FEES § 2.2, at 94 (1973), cited with
approval in People v. Nutt, 696 P.2d 242, 248 (Colo. 1984) (holding that a contingent fee
should not be fixed so high that it ceases to measure due compensation for professional services
and makes lawyer "a partner or proprietor in the law suit"); Contingent Fees, supra note 3, at
71-72.
A typical argument in support of a standard contingent fee is that it overcompensates
lawyers in some cases in order to make up for the unsuccessful cases. See, e.g., Romano v.
Lubin, 365 Pa. Super. 627, 631, 530 A.2d 487, 488 (1987) ("When the court calculates the fee
of a plaintiff's attorney, it must consider that the very same attorney may have spent
thousands of uncompensated hours working on other cases"); Aronson, Attorney-Client Fee
Arrangements: Regulation and Review, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 82 (1980) ("the individ
ual clients whose cases result in large recoveries pay more for their legal services than they
might otherwise, in order to protect their attorney/insurer against the losses he has suffered
and will continue to suffer from other cases"); Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys'Fees: What is
"Reasonable"?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 281, 324-25 (1977), quoted in Clark v. Sage, 102 Idaho
261, 265, 629 P.2d 657, 661 (1981). This Article rejects that argument. Overcharging violates
the lawyer's fiduciary and ethical obligations to the client. In every contingent fee case, a
lawyer may charge a risk premium that will compensate for the risks borne by the lawyer in
that case. Success or failure in other cases is irrelevant to the fiduciary and ethical issues.
55 MODEL CODE, supra note 47, EC 7-8 (as fiduciary, the "lawyer should exert his best
efforts to insure that decisions of his client are made only after the client has been informed of
relevant considerations"); MODEL RULES, supra note 47, Rule 1.4(b) ("[A] lawyer «HAII ex-
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rangement to be "informed," the client must not only be given the
relevant information'® but must also comprehend it."
The cUent, therefore, must be given the option of whether to pay
a contingent, hourly, or fixed fee'® and has the right to be informed in
a non-self-interested manner by the lawyer" regarding which option
represents the client's, not the lawyer's, best interest.®"
plain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed deci
sions regarding the representation"); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 47, EC 7-7 ("it is for
the client to decide whether he will accept a settlement offer"); MODEL RULES, supra note 47,
Rule 1.2(a). See generally Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent
and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41 (1979) (arguing that the doctrine of informed
consent should be applied to the lawyer-client relationship). The correlative duty of the lawyer
to disclose all material information to the client comes from the law of agency. See F.
MECHAM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 541 (4th ed. 1952); cf RESTATEMENT (SEC
OND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1957).
56 See. e.g., Bumham v. Heselton, 84 Me. 578, 20 A. 80 (1890) (after determining that
payment of a $250 note was assured, but not disclosing that information to the client, lawyer
hired to collect the note proposed and client accepted fee of aU collected proceeds above $75;
struck down because the lawyer had not informed the client of all material facts bearing on the
appropriateness of the fee known to the lawyer); Kickland v. Egan, 36 SJ3. 428,439,155 N.W.
192, 195 (1915) (lawyer should have advised the client before bargaining for fee that services
would be nominal because another firm was representing the estate and would be doing most
of the work; therefore, one-third contingent fee of the amount client was to receive was struck
down). "Only after ... disclosure [of all fee information] is given can a client's consent to pay
a certain fee be considered truly voluntary." 1 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 53, at 71.
57 Contingent Fees, supra note 3, at 67 n.l30; see also supra note 44.
58 MODEL RULES, supra note 47, Rule 1.5 comment ("When there is doubt whether a
contingent fee is consistent with the client's best interest, the lawyer should offer the client
alternative bases for the fee and explain their implications."). The requirement that the lawyer
must extend the option to the client to pay an hourly rate is implicit in the Ethical Considera
tions of the MODEL CODE, supra note 47, the comment to Rule 1.5, and the fiduciary require
ment that the lawyer deal fairly with prospective or actual clients. See ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1521 (1986); see also In re Reisdorf, 80 N.J. 319,
403 A.2d 873 (1979); Estate of Vafiades v. Sheppard Bus Serv. Inc., 192 N.J. Super. 301, 469
A.2d 971 G^.J. Super, A. Law Div. 1983); MICH CT. R. 8.121(E) ("An attorney must advise a
client, before entering a contingent f e e arrangement, t h a t attorneys m a y b e employed u n d e r . . .
hourly or per diem basis."); N.J. CT. R. l:21-7(b) ("An attorney shall not enter into a contin
gent fee arrangement without first having advised the client of the right and afforded the client
an opportunity to retain him under an arrangement whereby he would be compensated on the
basis of the reasonable value of his services."); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655.013(2) (West 1980 &
Supp. 1988) (in a malpractice action, attorney must offer client option of paying on a per diem
or hourly basis).
59 Supra notes 38-39.^
60 520 E. 72nd Commercial Corp. v. 520 E. 72nd Owners Corp., 691 F. Supp. 728, 738
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd, 872 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1989); MODEL CODE, supra note 47, EC 2-20
("a lawyer generally should decline to accept employment on a contingent fee basis ... [if his
client] is able to pay a reasonable fixed fee . . .[but] where justified by the particular circum
stances of a case [it is not necessarily improper for a lawyer] to enter into a contingent fee
contract. . . with ... [a] client who, after being fully informed of all relevant factors, desires
that arrangement"); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 47, EC 5-7; MODEL RULES, supra note
47, Rule 1.5 comment; 2 E. THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW 743 (1914) ("Attorneys, in
entering into contracts of employment with clients, are required to exercise the highest order
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GAGNON, FIDUCIARY LAW AND ETHICAL OBLIGATION

Application of the fiduciary and ethical principles explicated in
this Article leads to the conclusion that the one-third fee charged in
Gagnon was illegal and unethical.
The attorney did not: oflFer the client the option of paying an
hourly rate; inform the client that it was in the client's best interest
that he be retained on an hourly rate; inform the client that there was
very little risk of nonrecovery and that a multimillion dollar recovery
was highly likely; or inform the client that a one-third contingent fee
would likely yield the attorney a fee of at least one thousand doUars
per hour.
For the court to exclude fiduciary and ethical requirements be
cause the client did not complain of the fee is to disregard the fiduci
ary and ethical requirement of informed consent.®' For the court to
fail to even discuss the applicable fiduciary and ethical principles re
quires no characterization; only a concurring opinion by Justice
Greaney even acknowledges that the issue of risk is germane to the
ethical and legal validity of a contingent fee.®^ That acknowledgment,
however, did not rise to the level of acknowledging a client's recipro
cal fiduciary and ethical rights when charged a one-third contingent
fee.®^
VI.

"MONEY MAKES THE WORLD GO ROUND"®^

The decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to efof good faith ... disclosing all information ... as to facts which would or might influence him
either in entering into, or refusing to execute the contract."). The lawyer has a fiduciary duty
"to present fairly and fully the nature of what he might be called upon to do in the prospective
lawsuit and the nature of his representation, the values at stake, and the likelihood of success."
Id.
In a possible passing gesture at informed consent, the court stated that the client had
"intelligently and freely testified that he was satisfied with the amount of the fee." Gagnon v.
Shoblom, 409 Mass. 63, 67 (1991). It is unclear what the court meant by "intelligently."
When viewed from the perspective of the principles elucidated in this Article, the client was
not intelligent with regard to the degree he had been taken advantage of by his attorney. See
infra text accompanying notes 72-74.
Gagnon, 409 Mass. at 69-72 & n.l (Greaney, J., concurring). Justice Greaney therein
states;
At a time when the gap between the service and the [contingent] fee in tort cases
appears to be becoming more and more pronounced, there may be a need to estabhsh a better sense of proportion. This case is illustrative of the problem. The
question raised by the [trial] judge deserves honest debate.
Id. at 72 (footnote omitted).
"[T]he one-third percentage has become institutionalized in the practice of the litigation
bar as the minimum rate to be charged in the typical tort case. Change, if it is to come, should
not come suddenly and to the disappointment of long-standing expectations." Id. at 70.
Money, CABARET (lyrics by Fred Ebb).
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fectively narrow the reach of fiduciary principles and ethical rules re
lating to contingent fees was strongly supported by the Massachusetts
Bar Association and the Massachusetts Academy of Trial Lawyers.®^
The trial judges's reduction of the fee from $975,CXX) to $695,000 was
not, of course, a simple matter of a $280,000 differential.®® It
portended millions of dollars in reduced fees in the future,®^ especially
in view of the fact that lawyers routinely charge substantial contin
gent fees in cases in which there is insubstantial risk. Indeed, contin
gent fees in personal injury cases yield plaintiffs' lawyers enormous
sums of money—in the range of $13 billion annually.®® Plaintiffs'
lawyers have used this wealth to purchase considerable influence in
Congress, thwarting all legislation that might conceivably threaten
their fee interests.®' By one estimate, these contributions, in toto, ex
ceed all other single-issue contributions in national pohtics.^° In view
of the above realities, and the serious abuses that exist in the area of
contingent fees," courts should exercise extreme care in discharging
their responsibilities to clients. Simply noting that the cUent has not
objected to the one-third fee does not discharge that responsibUity.
Moreover, the chent in Gagnon indicated that he had interviewed sev
eral other law firms; all had quoted him the same one-third contingent
fee.'^ Obviously, he could have only concluded that a one-third fee
was the industry standard—as indeed it is.'® Accordingly, the client
See supra note 4.
The decision in this case could affect attorney's fees in every action in courts of this
Commonwealth where there is a contingency fee agreement. Many of the state
ments ... [by the lower court] could be deemed to apply to a wide range of
situations beyond the case that was specifically before him.
Brief for Massachusetts Bar Association, Thirteen County Bar Associations, and Women's Bar
Association, as Amici Curiae in support of Appellant at 12, Gagnon (No. 5399).
I have recently testified at a fairness hearing before a representative of United States
District Judge Jack Weinstein about a reduction of plaintiffs' attorney fees in claims before the
Manville Personal Injury Trust. Testimony of Lester Brickman (Fairness Hearing), Findley v.
Blinken {In re Johns Manville), Ch. 11 Case Nos. 82 B 11656 to 82 B11676 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 2,
1991) (CA 90-3973). I proposed that a reduction, not from the prevailing rate averaging
thirty-five percent but rather from the proposed limitation of twenty-five percent, to $250 an
hour or $75 an hour more than the average hourly rate charged by defendants' attorneys in
asbestos cases, would save the Manville fund as much as $250 million over the life of the fund.
68 Income from contingent fees in personal injury cases exceeded $10 billion dollars in
1985. Contingent Fees, supra note 3, at 76 n.l86. Adjusting that to 1991 dollars and adding a
component to reflect the enormous contingent fees being generated by asbestos litigation yields
an amount in excess of $13 billion dollars.
69 See Moore, Trial Lawyers on Trial, 49 NAT'L J. 2962 (Dec. 8, 1990); England, Congress,
Nader and the Ambulance Chasers, AM. SPECTATOR, Sept. 1990, at 18.
'o England, supra note 69, at 18.
•'I See Contingent Fees, supra note 3, at 113, 127-28.
'2 Affidavit of Donald Gagnon at 3 (Jan. 7, 1989), Gagnon (No. 5399).
'3 "[T]he one-third percentage has become institutionalized in the practice of the litigation
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would likely not have regarded the one-third fee unfair since that was
what all lawyers apparently charged. However, if all the price infor
mation that the client was provided with was the contingent fee per
centage, he was not in the position to give his informed consent.'^
Unless the chent is informed of the projected hourly rate that the con
tingent fee is designed to yield, he simply is not in a position to com
prehend what he is really being charged. Moreover, by sustaining the
one-third fee, courts are lending their imprimatur to price-fixing. For
over one hundred years, lawyers have successfully sought to insulate
themselves from market forces. A central feature of all codes of ethics
and other bar association regulations of lawyer conduct has been the
restraint on price competition. Despite United States Supreme Court
intervention,'^ the institutional conditions necessary to a competitive
market do not yet exist in the legal services context. This is most
especially true for contingent fees. The evidence that contingent fees
yield more than competitive rates of return is far-ranging.'® The in
dustry standard one-third fee did not result from the operation of
competitive market forces but rather from poUtical decisions." But
for these pohtical decisions, the industry standard today would be
fifty percent.'® A court does not effectuate its responsibilities to cli
ents by joining with the bar" to enforce the current industry standard
against chents.
The courts as guardians of clients' correlative fiduciary and ethi
cal rights should reject Gagnon v. Shoblom as the industry standard
for judicial regulation of contingent fees. Sed quis custodiet ipsos
Custodesl^
bar as the minimum rate to be charged in the typical tort case." Gagnon, 409 Mass at 70
(Greaney, J., concurring); see also Contingent Fees, supra note 3, at 100 n.280.
Supra note 55 and accompanying text.
'5 See, e.g., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Bates v. State Bar, 433
U.S. 350 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
See Contingent Fees, supra note 3, at 103-11.
" Id. at 106-107.
78 Id.
7' As evidence that a one-third fee was reasonable, the court noted that "a leading member
of the bar who specializes in prosecuting personal injury claims for plaintiflfs testified as to the
reasonableness of the fee." Gagnon, 409 Mass. at 64.
80 JUVENAL, VI SATIRES line 347, quoted in J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS, at
122) (E. Beck 15th ed. 1980) ("But who is to guard the guards themselves?"). To which Plato,
in effect responded 300 years earlier: "What an absurd idea—a guardian to need a guardian!"
PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, Book 3, 403-E (quoted in J. BARTLETT, supra, at 122). Today, the
idea is no longer absurd.

